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INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	A-00	CCO-00	CG-00	CIAE-00
	COME-00	CTME-00	INL-00	DODE-00	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	SRPP-00
	DS-00	EAP-00	EB-00	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	UTED-00	VC-00
	FRB-00	TEDE-00	INR-00	INSE-00	IO-00	JUSE-00	LAB-01
	L-00	VCE-00	M-00	AC-00	DCP-01	NRCE-00	NSAE-00
	NSCE-00	OCS-00	OIC-02	PA-00	TFBI-00	PM-00	PRS-00
	ACE-00	P-00	IRM-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TEST-00	USIE-00
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 FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1396
 INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
 DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SINGAPORE 004495

E.O. 12958: N/A
 TAGS: PTER, SN
 SUBJECT: ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT SUBMISSION

REF: STATE 301352

EMBASSY'S SUBMISSION, KEYED TO THE QUESTIONS IN PARA 2 OF
 REFTTEL, IS PROVIDED BELOW.

QUESTION A: SIGNIFICANT ACTIONS TO SUPPORT GLOBAL COALITION

LAW ENFORCEMENT STEPS

IN JANUARY 2003, THE GOVERNMENT RELEASED A WHITE PAPER, WHICH DESCRIBED SINGAPORE'S INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH (JI) TERRORIST NETWORK DISCOVERED IN 2001. THE SINGAPORE JI NETWORK PLANNED TO BOMB THE U.S. EMBASSY, AMONG OTHER TARGETS. SINGAPORE ANNOUNCED NO NEW DOMESTIC TERRORIST ARRESTS IN 2003, BUT DID RECEIVE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES FOUR OF ITS CITIZENS WHO ARE TERRORIST SUSPECTS: MOHAMMAD ASLAM YAR ALI KHAN, FROM AFGHANISTAN IN DECEMBER 2002 (ANNOUNCED IN JANUARY 2003); ARIFIN BIN ALI, FROM THAILAND IN MAY; AND MUHAMMAD ARIF BIN NAHARUDIN AND MUHAMMAD AMIN BIN MOHAMED YUNOS FROM PAKISTAN IN OCTOBER. ALL FOUR MEN ARE BELIEVED TO BE JI MEMBERS. ASLAM WAS DETAINED BY THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE IN AFGHANISTAN IN NOVEMBER OF 2001; HE HAD LEFT SINGAPORE IN OCTOBER THAT YEAR. ARIFIN LEFT SINGAPORE IN DECEMBER 2001 AS

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AUTHORITIES BEGAN THEIR INITIAL ROUND OF JI ARRESTS. SINGAPORE AUTHORITIES PROVIDED INFORMATION TO THAILAND WHICH RESULTED IN ARIFIN'S CAPTURE IN MAY; HE WAS DEPORTED TO SINGAPORE THE NEXT DAY. ARIF AND AMIN WERE DETAINED BY PAKISTAN IN KARACHI IN SEPTEMBER. ALL FOUR MEN ARE BEING HELD UNDER THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT (ISA), BRINGING TO 35 THE TOTAL NUMBER OF JI-RELATED ISA DETAINEES. IN ADDITION, FIVE PERSONS CONTINUE TO BE UNDER ISA RESTRICTION ORDERS IMPOSED IN 2001 OR 2002; SUCH ORDERS LIMIT A PERSON'S FOREIGN TRAVEL AND ACTIVITIES.

INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATIVE COOPERATION

SINGAPORE COOPERATED WITH A VARIETY OF GOVERNMENTS TO INVESTIGATE TERRORIST GROUPS, ESPECIALLY THE JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH. ONLY SOME DETAILS OF THIS COOPERATION, WHICH OCCURRED THROUGH BOTH INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT CHANNELS, HAVE BEEN MADE PUBLIC. HOWEVER, SINGAPORE INTERNAL SECURITY OFFICIALS HAVE LONGSTANDING COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS WITH COUNTERPARTS IN MALAYSIA, WHICH APPEAR TO HAVE ASSISTED THE INVESTIGATIONS OF BOTH COUNTRIES INTO TERRORIST GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS. COUNTRIES TARGETED BY THE JI FOR ATTACK, INCLUDING THE U.S., AUSTRALIA, BRITAIN, THAILAND, AND INDONESIA ALSO EXCHANGED INFORMATION WITH SINGAPORE.

IN FEBRUARY, A TIP-OFF FROM SINGAPORE LED TO THE ARREST OF SINGAPORE CITIZEN AND ALLEGED SINGAPORE JI LEADER MAS SELAMAT KASTARI ON THE INDONESIAN ISLAND OF BATAM, NEAR SINGAPORE. KASTARI, WHO FLED SINGAPORE IN DECEMBER 2001, IS ALLEGED TO HAVE PLANNED SOON THEREAFTER TO HIJACK A PLANE AND CRASH IT INTO SINGAPORE'S CHANGI AIRPORT; HE DROPPED THE PLANS AFTER AUTHORITIES LEARNED OF THE PLOT AND ISSUED A PUBLIC WARNING. KASTARI, WHO WAS USING A FRAUDULENT INDONESIAN PASSPORT, WAS CONVICTED IN JULY ON INDONESIAN CRIMINAL CHARGES; SINGAPORE HAS REQUESTED KASTARI'S DEPORTATION TO AID THEIR INVESTIGATIONS OF THE JI. INDONESIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE ALLOWED SINGAPORE INVESTIGATORS TO INTERVIEW KASTARI.

AS NOTED ABOVE, INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THAILAND BY SINGAPORE AUTHORITIES IN MAY LED TO THE ARREST OF ARIFIN BIN ALI. AS A RESULT OF THAT INVESTIGATION, THAI AUTHORITIES ALSO ARRESTED SEVERAL THAI CITIZENS BELIEVED TO BE MEMBERS OF THE JI; THE ARRESTS WERE THE FIRST JI DETENTIONS IN THAILAND. SINGAPORE AUTHORITIES LATER STATED THAT THEY HAD CONVEYED TO THAILAND INFORMATION FROM ARIFIN THAT THE JI GROUP INTENDED TO BLOW UP FIVE EMBASSIES IN BANGKOK, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY.

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A THAI FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN PUBLICLY CREDITED SINGAPORE FOR KEY INFORMATION WHICH HELPED THAILAND TRACK DOWN AND ARREST JI LEADER HAMBALI (RIDUAN ISAMUDDIN) IN AUGUST. THE SPOKESMAN SAID THAT SINGAPORE REPORTS FROM ARIFIN'S DEBRIEFING HAD PROVIDED KEY INSIGHTS WHICH, ALONG WITH INFORMATION FROM THE UNITED STATES AND CAMBODIA, HAD LED TO HAMBALI'S CAPTURE.

IN JUNE, SINGAPORE PROVIDED KEY ASSISTANCE IN THE INDONESIAN TRIAL OF ABU BAKAR BASHIR. THREE SINGAPORE ISA DETAINEES (FAIZ BAFANA, HASHIM ABAS, AND JAAFAR MISTOOKI) TESTIFIED BY VIDEOCONFERENCE IN THE TRIAL; MANY OBSERVERS CONSIDERED FAIZ BAFANA'S TESTIMONY THE MOST EFFECTIVE EVIDENCE THAT WAS PRESENTED AGAINST BASHIR.

IN MAY, SINGAPORE DESIGNATED BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM AS "PRESCRIBED" COUNTRIES UNDER THE 2002 TERRORIST FINANCING LAW; THE STEP ALLOWS SINGAPORE TO RESPOND TO TERRORIST FINANCING-RELATED INFORMATION REQUESTS AS IF A

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TRIES. HOWEVER, AS NOTED ABOVE, SINGAPORE HAS REQUESTED OTHER STATES TO DEPORT TO IT ITS CITIZENS WHO ARE TERRORIST SUSPECTS, AND HAS OBTAINED TWO SUSPECTS IN THIS FASHION. THAI AUTHORITIES PUBLICLY STATED THAT THEY INTENDED TO ASK SINGAPORE TO EXTRADITE ARIFIN BIN ALI (NOTE: SEE ANSWER TO QUESTION A FOR BACKGROUND ON ARIFIN, A SINGAPOREAN CITIZEN). HOWEVER, THAILAND AND SINGAPORE DO NOT HAVE AN EXTRADITION TREATY, AND IT IS UNCLEAR THAT AN EXTRADITION REQUEST HAS ACTUALLY BEEN FILED. NO OTHER POSSIBLE TERRORIST-RELATED EXTRADITION REQUESTS OF SINGAPORE ARE KNOWN.

QUESTION D: IMPEDIMENTS TO PROSECUTION/EXTRADITION

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SINGAPORE HISTORICALLY HAS PREFERRED TO DEAL WITH INTERNAL SECURITY THREATS THROUGH USE OF PREVENTIVE DETENTION, RATHER THAN PROSECUTION; THIS PREFERENCE CONTINUES AS THE THREAT HAS SHIFTED FROM COMMUNISTS TO TERRORISTS. REASONS GIVEN FOR THIS PREFERENCE INCLUDE THE ABILITY OF PREVENTIVE DETENTIONS TO SAFEGUARD SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND THE IDENTITY OF WITNESSES, AND THE HOPE THAT VALUABLE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CAN BE OBTAINED FROM DETAINEES WHO ARE KEPT OUT OF AN ADVERSARIAL JUDICIAL PROCESS WHICH WOULD RESULT IN A FIXED SENTENCE. INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS PROVIDE AUTHORITIES WITH AN EFFECTIVE TOOL AGAINST TERRORIST SUSPECTS, ALBEIT A

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TOOL EXPLICITLY IN DEROGATION OF NORMAL RIGHTS UNDER THE SINGAPORE CONSTITUTION.

THERE ARE NO KNOWN PRECEDENTS INVOLVING THE EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, EITHER FROM OR TO SINGAPORE. WHILE SINGAPORE HAS AN EXTRADITION RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES (THROUGH BILATERAL CONTINUATION OF THE 1931 U.S.-UK TREATY), SINGAPORE LACKS EXTRADITION RELATIONSHIPS WITH MANY OTHER COUNTRIES.

IN SOME CASES, SINGAPORE'S EXCLUSIVE USE OF INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS AGAINST TERRORISTS, RATHER THAN PROSECUTION, COULD BE A COMPLICATING FACTOR IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES ON PROSECUTION OF TERRORIST SUSPECTS. SINGAPORE MIGHT BE CONCERNED THAT INFORMATION IT CONSIDERS SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION, IF SHARED WITH COUNTRIES INTENDING PROSECUTIONS, COULD BE MADE PUBLIC AND/OR SHARED WITH DEFENSE LAWYERS. HOWEVER, SINGAPORE'S ASSISTANCE IN FACILITATING VIDEO TESTIMONY OF THREE OF ITS ISA DETAINEES IN THE INDONESIAN TRIAL OF BASHIR INDICATES THAT IT IS WILLING TO BE FLEXIBLE, DESPITE THIS CONCERN.

SINGAPORE AND THE U.S. CONTINUED A CLOSE COUNTERTERRORISM RELATIONSHIP, INCLUDING THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION THROUGH INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT CHANNELS.

QUESTION E: RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION

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SINGAPORE HAS QUICKLY CONDEMNED MAJOR TERRORIST ATTACKS DURING 2003, INCLUDING THE AUGUST ATTACK ON THE MARRIOTT HOTEL IN JAKARTA, AND THE BOMBING THE SAME MONTH OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMPOUND IN BAGHDAD.

QUESTION F: MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS

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IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE, IN JANUARY, SINGAPORE HOSTED AND COSPONSORED WITH THE UNITED STATES A JANUARY WORKSHOP ON MEASURES TO CUT OFF TERRORISM FINANCING. ATTENDEES AT THE WORKSHOP INCLUDED REPRESENTATIVES OF ASEAN STATES AND PACIFIC ISLAND FORUM MEMBERS, THE UN COUNTERTERRORISM COMMITTEE, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF), AND THE ASIA-PACIFIC GROUP ON MONEY LAUNDERING. THE WORKSHOP ADDRESSED COMPLIANCE WITH AND IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 1373 OBLIGATIONS AND THE EIGHT SPECIAL RECOMMENDATIONS ON TERRORIST FINANCING OF THE FATF, WITH A PARTICULAR FOCUS ON ELEMENTS OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK NEEDED TO MEET -- AND THE TOOLS NEEDED TO IMPLEMENT -- THOSE OBLIGATIONS.

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QUESTION G: ANY SIGNIFICANT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

NONE.

QUESTION H: PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRY

NONE.

QUESTION I: SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN ATTITUDE ON TERRORISM

NONE. SINGAPORE CONTINUED ITS STRONG PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
OPPOSITION TO TERRORISM, AND VIGOROUS CT ACTION, BOTH BY
ITSELF, AND IN BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL CONTEXTS.

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